Has the Fight Against al-Shabab Failed?

The persistent drumbeat of violence in Somalia offers a grim answer to a critical question. Despite nearly two decades of intense international and regional counterterrorism efforts, the al-Qaeda-linked militant group al-Shabab remains a potent and adaptive force.

Recent reports from UN experts deliver a sobering assessment, confirming the group is not only resilient but expanding its threat. This reality forces a stark reevaluation of a multi-billion dollar, multinational campaign.

The conflict’s complexity is often lost in headlines of bombings and military offensives. It is a tangled web of clan politics, regional rivalries, and failed governance, where military action alone cannot untie the knots of instability.

This exhaustive analysis delves into the roots of this failure, examining the strategic missteps, enduring strengths of the insurgency, and the precarious path forward for Somalia and its allies.

The Unyielding Threat: Al-Shabab’s Current Status

According to the UN Monitoring Group, al-Shabab commands between 7,000 and 12,000 fighters. It maintains control over vast rural areas and continues to levy taxes, effectively running a parallel state.

Its financial and operational resilience defies years of airstrikes, ground operations, and sanctions. The group has proven to be a hydra, often regenerating capabilities as quickly as they are degraded.

A Financial Juggernaut

Al-Shabab’s economic engine is perhaps its most formidable asset. Estimates suggest the group generates between $100 million and $200 million annually through a sophisticated, diversified portfolio.

This financial war chest funds operations, pays fighters, and buys loyalty, creating a self-sustaining cycle of conflict. Their revenue streams are deeply embedded in the daily economy of the Horn of Africa.

• Extortion and “Taxation”: A pervasive system of levies on businesses, farms, and trade routes, often more efficient than government tax collection.
• Charcoal Trafficking: A multi-million dollar trade, exploiting Somali resources despite a UN ban, with exports flowing through ports al-Shabab controls or influences.
• Bank Heists and Money Laundering: Direct raids on banking hubs and complex laundering through the hawala system and real estate in major cities.
• Control of Agricultural Heartlands: Dominance in regions like the Lower Shabelle allows taxation of lucrative sugar, banana, and maize harvests.
• Livestock and Customs Duties: Imposing fees on the export of animals and goods moving through checkpoints, creating a reliable income stream.
• Investments in Legitimate Business: Infiltration of the telecommunications, transportation, and construction sectors to clean and reinvest profits.

“Al-Shabab runs what is arguably the most sophisticated and profitable insurgent financing operation in the world. They are not just a terrorist group; they are a criminal conglomerate with an army,” noted a former UN sanctions investigator in a report for Reuters.

Territorial and Tactical Adaptation

The group has strategically ceded some urban centers to avoid direct, conventional confrontation. Instead, it focuses on holding rural populations hostage and waging a campaign of asymmetric warfare.

Its tactical evolution includes more complex, sustained attacks on military bases and the increased use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). This mirrors challenges faced in other conflict zones, where insurgent adaptability often outpaces static defense strategies.

The Architecture of the Counter-Insurgency

The fight against al-Shabab is a multinational endeavor, but this very complexity is a source of weakness. Coordination is hampered by competing interests, mandates, and political endgames.

The campaign relies on a fragile triad: the Somali National Army, a African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), and unilateral US and Turkish support. Each pillar suffers from critical flaws.

The Somali National Army: A Force in Name Only?

The SNA is the intended centerpiece of the “Somali-led” security transition. Yet, it remains fragmented, under-resourced, and plagued by corruption and clan loyalties that often supersede national command.

Soldiers frequently go unpaid for months, leading to desertion, predation on civilians, and vulnerability to al-Shabab infiltration. Building a professional, national army is a generational challenge, not one solved by training camps alone.

• Clan-Based Militia Integration: Many SNA units are former clan militias with parochial loyalties, resisting integration and unified command.
• “Ghost Soldiers”: Rampant payroll fraud where commanders pocket salaries for non-existent troops, gutting actual troop strength and morale.
• Logistical Collapse: Chronic shortages of food, ammunition, and medical support, making units dependent on ATMIS for basic sustenance.
• Lack of Combat Support: Minimal organic artillery, intelligence, medical, or engineering capacity, rendering it ineffective for independent operations.
• Abuses Against Civilians: Arbitrary arrests, theft, and violence by SNA troops, which al-Shabab exploits for recruitment propaganda.

ATMIS and the Drawdown Dilemma

ATMIS, the successor to AMISOM, has been the primary bulwark holding major cities. Its planned drawdown, however, has created a dangerous security vacuum that al-Shabab eagerly fills.

The transition is politically driven by donor fatigue and a desire for Somali ownership, but it is not conditions-based. As seen with other international withdrawals, like the EU Forges $105 Billion Lifeline for Kyiv, timing is everything, and premature exits can collapse frontline stability.

“The phased withdrawal of ATMIS forces is occurring without the SNA achieving readiness. We are essentially handing back territory, not transitioning it. This is a recipe for rapid reversal,” warned a Horn of Africa analyst in an interview with AP News.

Strategic Blunders and Enduring Challenges

The counter-insurgency has been marred by a series of recurring strategic errors. These are not mere tactical failures but fundamental misunderstandings of the conflict’s nature.

An over-reliance on kinetic solutions and a neglect of the political and ideological battlefield have allowed al-Shabab to retain its narrative appeal and social roots.

The Governance Vacuum

Where military offensives clear areas, the Somali government has consistently failed to establish legitimate, effective governance and services. This governance vacuum is the single greatest enabler of al-Shabab’s resurgence.

Corruption at the highest levels of the federal government in Mogadishu erodes public trust. This dynamic, where political elites are perceived as self-serving, is not unique to Somalia, as seen in stories of political divides like the Tim Walz Family’s Political Divide.

• No “Clear, Hold, Build”: Operations clear, but the state cannot hold or build, allowing militants to return and punish those who cooperated.
• Appointment of Corrupt or Incompetent Officials: Local administrators are often chosen for clan patronage, not merit, and replicate Mogadishu’s corruption.
• Absence of Basic Services: No justice, education, or healthcare follows military victories, making al-Shabab’s rudimentary courts seem preferable.
• Land Disputes and Clan Favoritism: The government fails to neutrally adjudicate the primary source of local conflict, pushing losing clans toward al-Shabab for redress.

The Ideological Battle, Lost by Default

Al-Shabab is not just a military organization; it is a purveyor of a harsh but coherent ideology. The counter-narrative from the state and religious authorities has been weak, fragmented, and often delegitimized by association with the West.

The group skillfully frames its struggle as one against foreign occupation and apostate rulers. This resonates in a country with a deep history of resistance to external intervention.

“We have outsourced security but ignored the war of ideas. Al-Shabab provides identity, purpose, and a perverse sense of justice. What does the government offer? Often, nothing but a uniform that steals from you,” stated a Somali civil society leader.

Regional Dimensions and Spillover Threats

The UN experts explicitly warn that al-Shabab remains a major threat to neighboring countries. The group has demonstrated both the intent and capability to export violence beyond Somalia’s borders.

Its attacks in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda underscore the transnational nature of the threat. Regional stability is inextricably linked to Somalia’s security, creating a complex geopolitical puzzle.

Kenya: A Persistent Target

Kenya’s incursion into Somalia in 2011 made it a prime target for retaliatory attacks. Devastating assaults like the 2013 Westgate Mall and 2015 Garissa University attacks were watershed moments.

The group exploits long, porous borders and marginalized Somali-Kenyan communities for recruitment and logistics. Kenyan security forces’ heavy-handed responses have, at times, fueled further resentment and recruitment.

Ethiopia: A Fragile Giant Entangled

Ethiopia, with its own large Somali population and historical interventions in Somalia, is deeply involved. Its troops are a critical part of ATMIS and also operate independently.

However, Ethiopia is now consumed by immense internal conflicts, like the war in Tigray. This diverts military resources and attention, potentially creating openings for al-Shabab to expand its influence along the border regions.

• Cross-Border Raids: Increased al-Shabab incursions into Ethiopia’s Somali region, testing Addis Ababa’s stretched defenses.
• Exploitation of Local Grievances: Attempts to radicalize ethnic Somalis in Ethiopia who feel marginalized by the central government.
• Diversion of Ethiopian Forces: Internal crises pull elite units away from the Somali front, weakening the overall counter-insurgency posture.
• Competition with Eritrea: The bitter Ethiopia-Eritrea rivalry plays out in Somalia via proxy support to different Somali factions, further fracturing the political landscape.

The Human Cost and Humanitarian Crisis

The prolonged conflict has created one of the world’s most severe and protracted humanitarian emergencies. Millions of Somalis are caught between the violence of al-Shabab, the neglect of their government, and the ravages of climate change.

Recurrent droughts, like the one threatening famine in 2022-2023, are weaponized by all sides. Al-Shabab blocks aid to government areas, while corruption diverts lifesaving supplies.

Displacement as a Weapon of War

Forced displacement is a central tactic. Al-Shabab displaces populations to punish and control, while military operations often trigger large-scale flight.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps around cities like Mogadishu are sprawling, desperate, and ripe for exploitation. They represent a massive failure of protection and a breeding ground for future instability.

“The camps are cities of the damned. No security, no future, no hope. Young men here have two choices: join al-Shabab to earn a little money or starve quietly. It is not a difficult choice for many,” reported a humanitarian aid worker.

International Actors: Part of the Solution or the Problem?

The international community is deeply invested but deeply divided on strategy. The United States, the European Union, Turkey, Qatar, and the UAE all have significant interests, which are not always aligned.

This patchwork of external support often reinforces the fragmentation of the Somali state, as different actors back different factions, much like the complex international reactions to crises elsewhere, such as the legal actions seen in Honduras Issues Arrest Warrant for Former President.

The United States: Drone Strikes and Strategic Drift

US strategy has heavily relied on targeted airstrikes and training of elite Somali units. While decapitating leadership, this approach has failed to degrade the group’s overall capacity and causes civilian casualties that fuel resentment.

The lack of a clear, consistent political strategy from Washington, beyond counterterrorism, has left a void. The mission is tactically focused but strategically myopic.

• Civilian Casualty Controversy: Strikes often kill non-combatants, providing al-Shabab with powerful propaganda and alienating local communities.
• Over-reliance on “Over-the-Horizon” Capacity: A strategy born of withdrawal from Afghanistan, it is insufficient for a networked, embedded insurgency like al-Shabab.
• Training Elite Units Only: Focus on Danab Brigade commandos creates a capable tip but does nothing to strengthen the weak spear (the rest of the SNA).
• Inconsistent Engagement: Policy shifts with changing administrations create uncertainty and hinder long-term partnership building.

The Gulf Rivalry: Somalia as a Proxy Arena

The bitter feud between the Qatar-Turkey axis and the Saudi Arabia-UAE alliance plays out destructively in Mogadishu. Funding flows to different political camps and commercial entities, distorting the economy and paralyzing politics.

This external patronage allows Somali leaders to bypass building domestic legitimacy through service delivery, as they can rely on foreign backers for financial and political survival.

Paths Forward: Is Success Still Possible?

Declaring total failure may be premature, but it is clear that the current path leads only to perpetual, grinding conflict. A fundamental strategic reset is required, one that prioritizes political settlement over military victory.

Success must be redefined not as the eradication of al-Shabab, but as the creation of a state legitimate and competent enough to permanently undercut its appeal.

Prioritizing Governance and Reconciliation

Every dollar spent on military assistance should be matched by one for governance, justice, and reconciliation. This means supporting credible local leaders, not just Mogadishu elites.

Clan conflicts, the bedrock of Somali politics, must be addressed through inclusive dialogue. Al-Shabab thrives on these fractures; a unified political front is its greatest nightmare.

“The solution is 80% political and 20% military. We have the equation backwards. We need a Somali-owned political compact that addresses grievances, not more foreign soldiers,” argued a European diplomat specializing in the Horn of Africa.

Reforming the Security Sector

Security sector reform must be ruthless and data-driven. This means biometric registration of all soldiers to eliminate “ghosts,” ensuring direct, digital payment of salaries, and holding abusive commanders accountable.

The drawdown of ATMIS must be explicitly tied to verifiable benchmarks of SNA readiness and the establishment of local administration, not arbitrary calendar dates.

• Direct Salary Payments: Use mobile money to pay soldiers directly, cutting out corrupt commanders and ensuring troop loyalty.
• Community-Based Policing: Invest in local police who understand the terrain and have a stake in community safety, rather than only a centralized army.
• Conditional Aid: Link all international security funding to measurable anti-corruption and human rights reforms within the SNA and government.
• Regional Force Coordination: Create a truly unified command for ATMIS and SNA operations to prevent al-Shabab from exploiting seams between forces.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is al-Shabab’s main goal?

Al-Shabab’s core objective is to overthrow the internationally recognized Federal Government of Somalia and establish an Islamic state governed by its strict interpretation of Sharia law. It views the government as a puppet of foreign, non-Muslim powers.

Why has the Somali army been unable to defeat them?

The Somali National Army is crippled by fragmentation along clan lines, systemic corruption including “ghost soldiers,” and a lack of reliable logistics and pay. It is not a unified, professional national force but a collection of militias with competing loyalties.

How does al-Shabab finance its operations?

It runs a diversified financial empire generating an estimated $100-200 million yearly. Key sources include extortion “taxes” on businesses and trade, illegal charcoal exports, bank robberies, and investments in legitimate sectors like telecoms.

What countries are most threatened by al-Shabab?

Beyond Somalia, Kenya is the most frequent target due to its military presence in Somalia. Ethiopia and Uganda also face direct threats, while the group’s destabilizing activities affect the entire East African region.

Can military force alone defeat al-Shabab?

No. Two decades of primarily military pressure have failed. While necessary for security, force must be coupled with effective, legitimate governance, economic opportunity, and a counter-narrative to al-Shabab’s ideology to achieve lasting stability.

What is the role of the United States?

The US provides critical support through airstrikes, intelligence, and training for elite Somali units like the Danab Brigade. However, its strategy is criticized for over-reliance on kinetic action and lacking a coherent long-term political plan for stabilization.

Key Takeaways

• Al-Shabab remains resilient and adaptive, with a robust financial network and deep social roots that military campaigns have not eradicated.
• The Somali National Army is fundamentally weak, undermined by clan politics, corruption, and poor logistics, making a “Somali-led” solution currently unrealistic.
• The planned drawdown of ATMIS forces risks creating security vacuums that al-Shabab is poised to fill, as the SNA is not ready to assume responsibility.
• The critical governance vacuum after military offensives is the single biggest strategic failure, allowing al-Shabab to return and re-establish control.
• International efforts are disjointed and often counterproductive, with Gulf rivalries fragmenting Somali politics and an overemphasis on military solutions.
• The humanitarian crisis is both a cause and consequence of the conflict, with millions displaced and aid manipulated as a weapon of war.
• A strategic reset is urgently needed, prioritizing political reconciliation, governance, and anti-corruption over purely kinetic military operations.
• Success must be redefined as building a legitimate state that removes the grievances al-Shabab exploits, not merely the group’s physical destruction.

Final Thoughts

The fight against al-Shabab has not failed in the sense of being abandoned; it continues with immense resources and sacrifice. However, it has failed strategically by misdiagnosing the disease. Treating a deep-rooted insurgency driven by governance failure and political fracture as primarily a military problem is a fatal flaw. The metrics of success—territory cleared, leaders killed—have proven meaningless without the political and social foundation to sustain those gains.

There are no quick fixes. The path forward demands uncomfortable truths and difficult choices from both Somali leaders and their international partners. It requires less focus on grand offensives and more on the mundane, painstaking work of building courts, paying teachers, ensuring clean local elections, and rooting out corruption from the police station to the presidency. As seen in other complex geopolitical struggles, from Ukraine to domestic political fractures, lasting stability requires more than weapons; it requires legitimacy, justice, and a viable alternative vision for the future. The question is whether the political will exists to pursue this longer, harder, but ultimately only viable road.

About the Author

Rachel Kim

International correspondent covering global affairs, geopolitics, and breaking world news with on-ground reporting experience.